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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(e)(ii)(West 2008) 
provides for jurisdiction for the Utah Supreme Court to 
review final orders of the Utah State Tax Commission. As to 
the sole issue decided by the Commission on the Petitioners' 
Motions for Summary Judgment, retroactivity of this Court's 
decision, the Commission's order is final. Petitioner has 
stipulated that if the Order is sustained on Appeal, "There 
are no other issues remaining" and "that the request for 
refunds in this matter shall have been fully resolved with 
no right to further appeal."1 
In Barker v. Utah Public Service Commission, 970 P.2d 
702, 706-07 (1998), the Court concluded that, unlike appeals 
from the district court, an agency appeal may be considered 
final as to a discrete issue even if other issues remain 
unresolved. Here, the Commission acknowledges that as to 
the discrete issue of retroactive application of the Court's 
decision, its decision is final. 
The Commission acknowledges, and the parties have 
stipulated that, if the decision is not sustained on that 
basis, the matter would require remand to the Commission to 
1
 Stipulation attached in Appendix as Exhibit A. 
1 
determine the proper method of valuation and the value of 
Petitioners' oil and gas for severance tax purposes as
 set 
forth in the statute. 
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jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over;... 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative 
proceeding originating with:... 
(ii) the State Tax Commission;.... 
The Court's reading of Section III of its prior 
decision in ExxonMobil, 2003 UT 53, 1 24, would be 
determinative of the sole issue presented in this appeal. 
This section is set forth in the appendix as Exhibit B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioners, Exxon Corporation, (Exxon) Mobil 
Exploration and Production North America, (MEPNA) and 
ExxonMobil Corporation, (ExxonMobil) appeal from the denial 
of Motions for Summary Judgment filed in four separate 
appeals before the Utah State Tax Commission, 06-0915 Exxon 
Corporation 1998, 06-1218 ExxonMobil Corporation 1999, 07-
1118 Mobil Exploration and Production 2000, 07-1124 
ExxonMobil Corporation 2000-2003. 
Course of Proceedings 
Exxon Corporation filed an amended 1998 severance tax 
return on May 19, 2005. The amended return claimed an 
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overpayment of $71,105.00.3 (06-0915 R.10.) On May 31, 
2006, the Auditing Division issued a statutory notice 
reducing the requested refund to $4,314.13 for the following 
reasons: 
a. Gathering costs are not allowable deductions; 
b. Oil stripper value was overstated because four 
wells claimed by Exxon did not qualify/ and 
c. Taxable value is not properly allocated between 
the three and five percent rates. 
Id. On June 29, 2006, Petitioner filed a Request for Agency 
Action and Petition for Redetermination (06-0915 R.l.) 
Exxon Corporation filed an amended 1999 annual 
severance tax return on May 24, 2006. The amended return 
indicated an overpayment of $94,303.00. (06-1218 R.202.) On 
August 30, 2006, the Auditing Division issued a statutory 
notice which reduced the refund request to $15,577.00. The 
Auditing Division disallowed claims for "gathering costs," 
which are not an allowable transportation deduction. (06-
1218 R.199-202.) On September 28, 2006, ExxonMobil 
Corporation filed a Request for Agency Action and Petition 
3
 As this case involves four separate appeals with four 
separately numbered records, citations to the record will 
distinguish the appeal number and page number of the record 
for Redetermination. (06-1218 R.193.) 
Mobil Exploration and Production (MEPNA) filed an 
amended 2000 annual severance tax return. The amended return 
claimed an overpayment of $261,444.00. On August 24, 2007, 
the Auditing Division issued a statutory notice denying the 
refund request. (07-1118 R.183-186.) On September 7, 2007, 
MEPNA filed a Request for Agency Action and Petition for 
Redetermination. (07-1118 R.177.) Exxon Corporation filed 
amended tax returns for 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. The 
amended returns indicated overpayments of $84,64 9.00 for tax 
year 2000, $389,689.00 for tax year 2001, $400,156.00 for 
tax year 2002, and $372,569.00 for tax year 2003. (07-1124 
R.188.) On August 22, 2007, the Auditing Division issued a 
statutory notice denying these refund requests in their 
entirety. (07-1124 R.185-188.) On September 7, 2007, 
ExxonMobil Corporation filed a Request for Agency Action and 
Petition for Redetermination. (07-1124 R.177.) 
On February 26, 2008, Petitioners filed Motions for 
Summary Judgment in each of the four appeals. (06-0915 R.67, 
06-1218 R.164, 07-1118 R.163, 07-1124 R.162.) Although the 
cases were never consolidated, because the grounds for 
Petitioners7 motions were identical in each case, a single 
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hearing on the motions was held on June 17, 2008. (06-0915 
R.510.) On November 17, 2008, the Commission issued its 
order denying Petitioners' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
(06-0915 R.509.) On December 11, 2008, Petitioners filed a 
Petition for Review. (06-0915 R.533.) 
Disposition of Administrative Proceedings 
On November 17, 2008, the Commission issued its order 
denying Petitioners' Motions for Summary Judgment in appeal 
numbers 06-0915, 06-1218, 07-1118, and 07-1124. (07-1118 
R.5.) In reviewing motions for summary judgment all facts 
and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Wayment v. Clear Channel BroaHr^tina.
 T n r 2 0 Q 5 U T 2 ^ n 6 
P.3d 271. 
The Commission, in ruling on the sole issue before it 
in the Motions for Summary Judgment, found that the 
selective prospective effect of the Court's prior decision 
was limited to the claim for refund in that proceeding. The 
Commission concluded: 
Therefore, there is no reason for the Commission 
to conclude that when the Court in ExxonMobil 
Corporation stated that ExxonMobil was entitled to 
"further adjudication of its claim for a refund" 
it meant something other than the specific refund 
claim that was before it in the matter. 
(06-0915 R.520.) The Commission therefore ruled that the 
various Petitioners (Exxon, ExxonMobil, and MEPNA) were not 
entitled to retroactive application of the Court's decision 
in the prior ExxonMobil case. Icl. The Motions for Summary 
Judgment were denied. (06-0915 R.515-520.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. ExxonMobil is the result of a merger between Mobil 
Corporation, and a wholly owned subsidiary of Exxon 
Corporation, which occurred on or about November 30, 1999. 
(06-0915 R.511.) 
2. During the 1990Ts MEPNA owned and operated oil and 
gas producing wells within the Greater Aneth Field in 
southern Utah. Those wells were located in the McElmo Creek 
Unit and the Ratherford Unit. (Id.) 
3. Prior to the merger, MEPNA had owned 39.956 
percent of the production from the McElmo Creek Unit. Exxon 
Corporation owned 24.787 percent and the remainder of the 
production was owned by Texaco and the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs. (Id. ) 
4. Prior to the merger, MEPNA had owned 64.367 
percent of the production from the Ratherford Unit. Exxon 
Corporation did not own any production from that field. The 
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remaining production was owned by Texaco, Chieftain, and the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. (Id.) 
5. From 1993 through 1998 MEPNA filed returns and 
paid severance taxes on its production of oil and gas from 
the Greater Aneth field by calculating the value of the oil 
based on its contract price. (06-0915 R.512.) Amended 
returns were filed for the 1993 through 1998 tax years for 
MEPNA's production during those periods. (id. ) 
6. The Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Division denied ExxonMobil's request for refunds regarding 
the returns originally filed by MEPNA for the 1993 through 
1998 tax years, (id.) The Commission upheld the Division's 
denial of the refund request. (Id. ) 
7. ExxonMobil appealed the Commission's decision to 
the Utah Supreme Court. (Id.) 
8. The Utah Supreme Court issued its decision on 
November 21, 2003 in ExxonMobil Corp. v. Utah State T^v 
Comm'n, 2003 UT 53,87 P.3d 706, remanding the matter back to 
the Tax Commission. (Id.) 
9. On remand, the Commission directed the Division to 
issue a severance tax refund to ExxonMobil. (06-0915 
R.513. ) 
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10. On or about May 24, 2005, ExxonMobil filed a 1998 
severance tax return claiming ExxonMobil Corporation had 
made an overpayment of $71,105.00. (Id. ) 
11. By Statutory Notice dated May 1, 2006 the Auditing 
Division denied most of the 1998 refund request relating to 
the tax paid by Exxon Corporation. ExxonMobil appealed the 
denial to the Utah State Tax Commission and the appeal was 
designated as Appeal Number 06-0915, the first of the Tax 
Commission Appeals in this matter. (Id.) 
12. On or about May 24, 2005, ExxonMobil filed an 
amended 1999 severance tax return that claimed Exxon 
Corporation had made an overpayment of $94,303.00. By 
Statutory Notice dated August 30, 2006, the Division 
informed ExxonMobil that the severance tax would be reduced 
by only $15,500.77. ExxonMobil appealed the denial of the 
remainder of the refund to the Utah State Tax Commission. 
The appeal is designated as Appeal Number 06-1218. 
13. On or about February 28, 2007, MEPNA filed an 
amended 2000 severance tax return, which indicated an 
overpayment of $261,444.00. By Statutory Notice dated 
August 24, 2007, the Division informed MEPNA that it denied 
the severance tax refund. MEPNA filed an appeal which is 
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identified as Appeal Number 07-1118. (06-0915 R.514.) 
14. On or about February 28, 2007, ExxonMobil filed 
amended severance tax return for the 2000 tax year, which 
claimed an overpayment of $84,649.00. By Statutory Notice 
dated August 24, 2007, the Division informed ExxonMobil that 
it denied its severance tax refund request for the 2000 tax 
year. ExxonMobil timely appealed the denial to the Utah 
State Tax Commission. The appeal is identified as number 
07-1124. (06-0915 R.514-515.) 
15. On or about February 28, 2007, ExxonMobil filed 
amended severance tax returns for the 2001, 2002, and 2003 
tax years, which indicated overpayments of $359,689.00 for 
2001, $400,155.83 for 2002, and $372,568.62 for 2003. By 
Statutory Notice dated August 24, 2007 the Division informed 
ExxonMobil it had denied its severance tax refund. 
ExxonMobil timely appealed the denial. The appeal is 
identified as number 07-1124. (06-0915 R.515.) 
16. On February 26, 2008 Petitioners filed Motions for 
Summary Judgment claiming that the prior ExxonMobil decision 
should be retroactively applied to their refund requests. 
(06-0915 R.71.) 
17. A hearing on the motions was held June 17, 2008. 
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(06-0915 R.510.) 
18. On November 17, 2008, the Commission issued its 
order denying Petitioners' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
(06-0915 R.509.) 
19. Petitioners filed this Petition for Review on 
December 10, 2008. (06-0915 R.513.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In ExxonMobil v. State Tax Comm'n, 2003 UT 53, 86 P.3d 
706, this Court clearly established the limited exception to 
the prospective application of its ruling and clearly stated 
the reasons for its holding: 
We give our holding this selectively prospective 
application because we are convinced that 
retroactive application could result in large 
refunds of taxes already collected and spent by 
governmental entities. Although the full breadth 
and depth of the impact is not immediately 
apparent from the record before us, no doubt it 
would be substantial and involve funds already 
budgeted, collected, and spent. Large refunds of 
money already collected and spent would pose a 
great burden on the amici revitalization funds and 
other relatively small governmental entities 
operating on correspondingly small budgets. Thus, 
whether in refund requests or deficiency 
proceedings, as to all but ExxonMobil the rule 
announced today is to have prospective application 
only. 
Id. at 1 23. The Court then reiterated in more concise 
fashion: 
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Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further 
adjudication for claim for a refund, as to other 
parties who may have refund requests, deficiency 
proceedings, or similar matters pending before the 
Tax Commission, our holding is to apply 
prospectively only. 
Id. at ! 24 . The Tax Commission, in its decision, relied on 
this reasoning and language, stating: 
Therefore, there is no reason for the Commission 
to conclude that when the Court in ExxonMobil 
Corporation stated that ExxonMobil was entitled to 
"further adjudication of its claim for refund" it 
meant something other than the specific refund 
claim that was before it in the matter. 
(06-0915 R.520). The Court's reasoning and its statements 
regarding selective prospectivity in ExxonMobil are 
consistent with the Court's prior application of that 
doctrine in Rio Alqom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681P.2d 
184(Utah 1984) and Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
862P.2d 1348(Utah 1993). Therefore, the Commission properly 
held that in the separate appeals in this matter involving 
tax years preceding 2004 the Court's interpretation of when 
"production was complete" in ExxonMobil would not apply. 
The doctrine of selective prospectivity was adopted by 
this Court. In applying that doctrine, the Utah Supreme 
Court is not bound by other courts' interpretations 
regarding rhe retroactive application of United States 
12 
Supreme Court precedent. The Utah Supreme Court applied the 
doctrine of selective prospectivity consistent with its own 
precedent. 
The application of the doctrine of selective 
prospectivity in the prior case was not "clearly erroneous." 
The ruling has had the desired effect and should not be 
overturned in this appeal. The issues raised at the time 
were valid and were thoroughly argued and briefed before the 
Court, both on appeal and on reconsideration. The Court 
should not retreat from its prior holding. 
Petitioners would not be entitled to summary judgment 
in any of the four cases presented even if the Court's 
interpretation of when "production is completed" in 
ExxonMobil were to be applied in these appeals. Petitioners 
have stipulated that the case would require remand for 
valuation if the Court were to reverse the Commission's 
decision. (See Appendix Exhibit A.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TAX COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOLLOWED THE LANGUAGE 
OF THE COURT AND UTAH PRECEDENT BY RULING 
SELECTIVE PROSPECTIVITY ONLY APPLIED TO THE CLAIMS 
PRESENTED BEFORE THE EXXONMOBIL COURT. 
The ExxonMobil decision only applies retroactively to 
the claims Mobil Exploration and Producing ("MEPNA") brought 
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for the years 1993 to 1998 that were the subject of the 
prior appeal. This accords with the specific language of 
the decision. When the Utah Supreme Court has applied 
selective prospectivity the Court has limited the 
retroactive effecr of its decisions to the claims presented 
before the Court. 
A. Selective Prospectivity Only Applies to the 
Claims Presented. 
The Utah Supreme Court has used the doctrine of 
selective prospectivity to limit the holding of a case to 
the claims presented on appeal while applying its holding 
prospectively to all other parties and claims. See Rio 
Alcorn Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 196 (Utah 
1984) (holding retroactive applicability of a tax applied to 
claims on which the "suit for refund was brought"); V-l Oil 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906, 915 (Utah 1996) 
(holding that where a taxpayer sought a refund for all taxes 
unconstitutionally assessed, that retroactive application 
applied Mto the year in which" the plaintiffs alleged they 
began to pay the surcharge) Overruled on other grounds, V-l 
Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906 (Utah 1997); 
Carter v. Beaver County Service Area, 16 Utah 2d 280, 283, 
399 P.2d 440, 442 (1965) (holding a decision would be 
14 
retroactive to the "instant case/7 but prospective as to all 
other cases) . 
In Rio Algom, for instance, taxpayers sought a refund 
for property taxes they paid under protest in 1981. 681 
P.2d at 186. The Utah Supreme Court held the property tax 
assessments were unconstitutional and granted the taxpayers 
relief for the year in which the refund was sought, while 
providing prospective application of the holding for all 
other claims. Id. at 196.; see also Kennecott Corp. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 862 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Utah 1993) (explaining the 
plain language of Rio Alqom indicates the decision only 
applied to parties to the case for 1981, the year in 
question). 
Further, in V-l, the plaintiff sought a refund for all 
monies that it claimed were unconstitutionally assessed as a 
fuel surcharge. 942 P.2d at 909. The Court initially 
agreed4 that the fuel surcharge was unconstitutional and 
held the decision applied retroactively to the claims of 
unconstitutionality raised before the Court and 
prospectively to all other claims. (Id. at 915.) 
* On reconsideration the Court reversed and found the 
Environmental Surcharge to be a fee, not a tax and therefore 
constitutional. V-l Oil v. State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906, 
918 (Utah 1997) . 
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Similarly, the Court in ExxonMobil provided retroactive 
application only for the refund claims MEPNA presented to 
the Court. The Court stated the Petitioner was entitled to 
"further adjudication of its claim for a refund," whereas 
all other parties who potentially had "refund claims, 
deficiency proceedings, or similar matters... our holding is 
to apply prospectivity only." ExxonMobil Corp., 2003 UT 53, 
1 24 (emphasis added.) MEPNA's claim for a refund in 
ExxonMobil included tax years 1993 to 1998. While it is 
clear the Court intended retroactive application of its 
decision on rehearing for the refund claim that was the 
subject of the appeal, it is equally clear that as to other 
"refund requests, audit deficiencies or similar matters" the 
holding was to "apply prospectively only." Id. 
This is consistent with the Court's previous 
application of selective prospectivity in Carter, Rio Alqom, 
Kennecott, and V-l. In none of those cases did the Court 
expand its doctrine of selective prospectivity beyond the 
claims presented to the Court to create a privilege that 
inured to a particular taxpayer outside of the context of 
the claim before the Court. The Commission correctly 
applied the Court's ruling when it refused to expand the 
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selective application of the Court's holding to claims not 
before the ExxonMobil Court. 
The Commission's application also accords with the 
judicial policy articulated by the Court, which was to limit 
the potential fiscal impact on amici and governmental 
entities. See Exxon, 2003 UT 53, 1 23. Expanding 
retroactive application of the Court's decision beyond the 
claims presented, to include unknown claims by different 
parties for different years and of completely different and 
expanded scope, would be in direct contradiction of the 
Court's stated rationale of limiting the potential impact of 
the decision. 
B. The Commission Did Not Have the Authority to 
Expand the Remand Order of the Court. 
When an appellate court remands an issue to the 
Commission the Commission only has the power to follow the 
order of remand and may not expand the order beyond the 
scope identified by the appellate court. See Collard v. 
Naale Const. Inc., 2006 UT 72, f 14, 149 P.3d 348 (holding 
"trial court's only option" on remand was to apply the 
appellate court's mandate.) The Commission on remand 
applied the Court's holding to the claims of MEPNA for the 
years in question, 1993 through 1998. 
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The current claims include claims by the former Exxon 
Corporation for 1998,for ExxonMobil and MEPNA separately for 
1999 and 2000 and for Exxon and MEPNA jointly for 2000 
through 2003. The entities involved, the scope of the 
claims, the years at issue, and the amounts at issue are all 
well beyond the scope of the claim that was before the Court 
in ExxonMobil- When the Court stated "as to all but 
ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective 
application only," there was no manifest intent to create a 
favored entity, or to establish on an ongoing basis, that 
any claim coming under the general corporate umbrella of a 
huge corporate entity was to receive distinct treatment 
under the law. Such a holding may well be suspect under 
equal protection analysis. Those concerns do not arise when 
the statement is viewed in the context in which it was made, 
specifically with reference to Court's remand for "further 
adjudication of its claim for a refund.'' 
There was no information in the prior record regarding 
the potential scope of treating ExxonMobil as a favored 
entity, or how many other potential subsidiaries, be they 
first, second, or third tier, might exist under various 
names and corporate organizations. The Court was aware, 
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however, of the scope of the claim presented and, taken in 
that context, rather than in isolation, the Court's 
statement "as to all but ExxonMobil" is reasonably and 
rationally related to "further adjudication" of its claim, 
as presented in that appeal. 
The Commission's interpretation of the Court's language 
to that effect is not erroneous. It is consistent with the 
Court's prior application of the doctrine of selective 
prospectivity and the Court's stated rationalization for its 
application in the particular instance. Therefore, the 
Commission's decision on the sole issue presented on appeal 
should be affirmed. 
II. THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF SELECTIVE PROSPECTIVITY 
IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The selective prospectivity applied in ExxonMobil 
should not be overturned. The decision is in harmony with 
previous cases applying selective prospectivity, therefore 
the ruling is not "clearly erroneous." 
A. The Court's Decision Accords with Prior Case 
Law on Selective Prospectivity. 
In Utah, state courts addressing issues of state law 
may determine whether a decision applies retroactively or 
prospectively, and federal precedent relating to retroactive 
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or prospective application is not binding. In Kennecott v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 862 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Utah 1993), this 
Court reviewed federal case law on retroactivity in the 
context of the selectively prospective application of its 
decision in Rio Algom. Quoting Justice Souter's decision ii 
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia. 501 U.S. 592, 111 
S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991) the Court stated: 
"[S]ince the guestion is whether the Court should 
apply the old rule or the new one, retroactivity 
is properly seen in the first instance as a matter 
of choice of law, a choice... between the 
principle of forward operation and that of 
relation backward." That choice, Justice Souter 
continued, is a federal one where the rule at 
issue itself derives from federal law, 
constitutional or otherwise. It follows from that 
analysis that when the rule involved is one of 
state law, as is the case here, the decision of 
prospectivity or retroactivity belongs to the 
state. 
Kennecott, 862 P.2d at 1351. This places the statement made 
by the Court in dicta in Andrews v. Morris. 677 P.2d 81, 91 
(Utah 1983), in its proper context. In Andrews, a state 
review of the death sentence of William Andrews and Pierre 
Dale Selby, the Court was dealing with retroactivity in a 
criminal context when the Court stated: 
We therefore hold that, subject to the exceptions 
stated below, a decision of this Court construing 
the Fourth Amendment is to be applied 
retroactively to all convictions that were not yet 
final at the time the decision was rendered. By so 
doing, however, we leave undisturbed our 
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precedents in other areas. First, our decision 
today does not affect those cases that would be 
clearly controlled by our existing retroactivity 
precedents. 
Id. at 91. The Court went on to enumerate those areas of 
Fourth Amendment law not affected by its decision and stated 
"finally, all questions of civil retroactivity continue to 
be governed by the standard enumerated in Chevron Oil 
Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97." (citations and footnotes 
omitted.) While the statement in Andrews appears sweeping on 
its face, the application of the statement in Andrews is 
limited by the Court's later statement in Kennecott. 
Chevron may be applicable in the analysis of the 
retroactivity of federal rules in civil matters, but as to 
the application of state law, it is not binding. It is 
telling that Chevron was not cited or analyzed by the Court 
in any of the cases decided subsequent to Andrews applying 
the doctrine of selective prospectivity in state cases. 
E.g., Kennecott, 862 P.2d at 1351; see also Rio Alqom, 681 
P.2d at 195 (noting purely prospective application of a 
decision overruling prior authority does not violate the 
U.S. Constitution). In Loyal Order v. County Board of 
Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 264 (1982), The Court stated, 
"Constitutional law neither requires nor prohibits 
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retroactive operation of an overruling decision." 
As a .result, the Court's own judicial policy determines 
whether to apply a decision retroactively or prospectively. 
This applies with particular force in regard to the Court's 
application of selective prospectivity in state tax cases. 
See Kennecotjb, 862 P.2d at 1351. Utah courts make this 
decision by determining the extent of reliance on previous 
state law and the burden that would be imposed by 
retroactive application. Van Dyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 
1023, 1025-26 (Utah 1991). While prospective application is 
often appropriate when laws are found to be 
unconstitutional, the Court also weighs the burden on state 
and local governments in matters of statutory interpretation 
and may, at its discretion, apply it decisions prospectively 
if retroactive application would impose an undue burden. 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984); see also 
Board of Education v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1037 
(Utah 1983) (holding purely prospective application was 
appropriate where a county treasurer did not fulfill his 
statutory duties and the county was liable for interest 
under the correct interpretation of the statute and 
retroactive application would burden taxpayers and the 
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county). 
In Board of Education, the Court held that a county 
treasurer was not following a statute requiring the 
treasurer to pay certain tax revenues to school districts at 
the end of each month. (Id. 1035.) While the Court 
determined the treasurer was liable for damages for monies 
not paid on time, the Court applied its decision 
prospectively because of the burden retroactive application 
may have had on the county and its taxpayers. Id. at 1037. 
This decision clearly establishes that prospective 
application of a rule is not restricted to instances where 
"new law" is established, but may be applied whenever an 
interpretation of a rule or law has been relied on or 
whenever retroactive application may impose an undue burden. 
The Court in ExxonMobil determined the Commission 
misinterpreted a severance tax definition. The Court's 
determination to have its interpretation of the definition 
apply prospectively accords with Board of Education. In 
both cases the Court determined that applying the Court's 
interpretation of the law retroactively may be overly 
burdensome on governmental entities, even though the Court 
merely interpreted a statute and did not establish "new 
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law." 
Moreover, as Board of Education illustrates, the 
judicial policy of the Court to apply a decision 
prospectively only depends on burdens that may be disruptive 
and does not require the Court to show that there will be an 
actual burden. 659 P.2d at 1037. This issue was fully 
briefed and argued by the parties and amici on both sides 
and was the subject of a motion for rehearing in ExxonMobil. 
To argue that the potential harm has not yet materialized 
does not mean that the potential for harm was not adequately 
demonstrated to the Court in ExxonMobil. 
B. The Court's Decision Is Not Clearly Erroneous. 
In Utah, a party asking the Utah Supreme Court to 
overturn prior precedent faces a "substantial burden of 
persuasion." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 
1994.) The Court may only overrule a prior decision if it 
is "clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as to 
render the prior decision inapplicable." Munson v. 
Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, 1 20, 173 P.3d 848. 
In Menzies, the Court overruled precedent that had been 
followed for twenty years because (1) the precedent 
overruled nearly a century of case law without explanation, 
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(2) the precedent cited no authority and performed little 
analysis to support its decision, and (3) the rule did "not 
work very well." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399-400. 
Further, in Munson, the Court justified its overruling 
of a case because "the issue did not benefit from the focus 
and refinement afforded issues actually litigated in the 
lower courts" and there was no "adversarial briefing of the 
issue." Id. at ! 21. The Court added that the overruled 
portion of the opinion was "almost an afterthought," had a 
"lack of analysis," and "simply [was] not supported by 
statutory language." Id. at I 20-21. 
The ExxonMobil decision differs from both of these 
cases in several major respects. First, unlike the 
precedent overruled in Menzies, the Court followed 
established case law on the issue of selective prospectivity 
and the Court supported its opinion with an analysis of the 
judicial policies to be advanced by applying selective 
prospectivity, namely, avoiding the burden to be placed on 
the government and amici. Also, unlike Menzies, nothing in 
the record indicates that the selective prospectivity 
applied in this case is not functioning precisely as the 
Court intended or that it is functioning other than how 
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prior cases applying selective prospectivity have 
functioned. 
Second, unlike in Munson, in this case the parties, and 
several amici presented adversarial briefs on the issue of 
retroactivity and prospectivity at both the initial stage 
and on rehearing. Further, the Court clearly supported its 
decision by citing to prior case law and by enunciating the 
judicial policy it sought to achieve by applying selective 
prospectivity. 
The Petitioners' bare assertions-that amici and State 
government would not be burdened if full retroactivity were 
applied is belied by the number and dollar amounts of the 
claims it brings in this appeal. Petitioner's arguments are 
insufficient to overcome the substantial burden of 
persuasion required for this Court to overrule its prior 
precedent. 
The Court's ruling on selective prospectivity in 
ExxonMobil is not "clearly erroneous." ExxonMobil's 
application of selective prospectivity of the holding in 
that case should be upheld. 
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CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of Selective Prospectivity has 
consistently been used to limit the financial impact of the 
Court's decision to the cases and the parties before it. 
This has the laudable impact of allowing governmental 
entities to adapt to the Court's ruling by changing their 
practices, adjusting their budgets, or addressing issues 
through legislation on an ongoing basis without the prospect 
of disrupting set budgets and settled expectations. 
The Court's statements in ExxonMobil are entirely 
consistent with its past application of the doctrines of 
Selective Prospectivity. The Commission properly took those 
statements in the context they were made as well as in the 
context of the Court's prior application of the doctrine 
when it determined that the Court's holding in ExxonMobil 
was to be given selective application only to those claims 
that were before the Court in that matter. Therefore, as to 
the single issue addressed by the Commission in the Motions 
for Summary Judgment and the only issue presented in this 
limited appeal, the Commission's determination was correct 
and should be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted this ,Vo day of July, 2009 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION and ) JOINT WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION 
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Petitioners. ) OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
v. ) DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR 
) DAM A GES PURSUANT TO R ULE 33 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. } 
) Case No. 20081017 
Respondent. ) 
) 
In an effort to resolve the dispute that has arisen from the motion to dismiss filed by the 
Utah State Tax Commission ("Commission") and the opposition filed in response thereto by-
ExxonMobil Corporation and Mobil Exploration and Producing ("Petitioners"'), the Parties 
stipulate as follows: 
1. The Commission hereby withdraws its Motion to Dismiss. 
2. Petitioners hereby withdraw their opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and its 
Request for Damages under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
3. The Parties agree that the sole issue addressed by the Commission's order below 
and on appeal to the Supreme Court is whether this Court's prior decision in ExxonMobil, 2003 
UT53 should be applied retroactively to Petitioners' requests for severance tax refunds. 
4 It the Commission pre\ails on appeal Petitioners belie\e that there aie no other 
issues remaining and the Pai les stipulate that ihe iequests for letunds in IILS matter shall na\e 
been fulh lesolved vuth no right to further appeal 
5 If Petitioners oie\ail the Parties agiee that this m?tter should be remanded to tne 
Commbsion foi application of the se\eiance tax statute aa interpreted b^ this Coun 
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H 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, and State of 
Utah, Respondents. 
No. 20021023. 
Nov. 25, 2003. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 20, 2004. 
Background: Oil corporation petitioned for review 
of decision of State Tax Commission denying cor-
poration's request for refund of allegedly miscalcu-
lated severance taxes on certain oil and gas in-
terests. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, \V ilk ins, J., held that: 
(1) Commission miscalculated oil company's sever-
ance taxes by determining value of corporation's 
taxable oil and gas interests at actual point of sale 
rather than immediate vicinity of point at which oil 
or gas was physically removed from earth, but 
(2) holding had prospective effect only since retro-
active application would have mandated large re-
funds of taxes already collected and spent by gov-
ernmental entities. 
Reversed. 
West Headnotes 
ill Mines and Minerals 260 <0^>87 
260 Mines and Minerals 
260111 Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells 
2601IK A) Statutory and Official Regulations 
260k87 k. Licenses; Severance and Pro-
duction Taxes. Most Cited Cases 
Tax Commission miscalculated oil company's sev-
erance taxes by determining value of corporation's 
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taxable oil and gas interests at actual point of sale 
rather than immediate vicinity of point at which oil 
or gas was physically removed from earth; Com-
mission's method of calculation was based not only 
on value of oil or gas actually removed from 
ground and thus taken from state's pool of natural 
resources, but on post-removal expenses as well, 
such as transportation and refinement costs, and 
statute governing severance taxes on oil and gas 
seemingly contemplated valuation in immediate vi-
cinity of point of removal from earth, assuming that 
point was one at which sales actually occurred. 
U.C.A.1953. 59-5-101, 59-5-103. 
|2| Statutes 361 € ^ 1 8 8 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k 187 Meaning of Language 
361kl88 k. In General. Most Cited 
Statutes 361 €^>206 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361\T(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
361k206 k. Giving Effect to Entire 
Statute. Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court interprets a statute by looking first 
to its plain language, and, in doing so, it gives all 
statutory provisions relevance and meaning inde-
pendent of other provisions. 
131 Statutes 361 € ^ 1 8 4 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361 kl 80 Intention of Legislature 
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(Cite as: 86 P.3d 706) 
361k184 k. Policy and Purpose of Act. 
Most Cited Cases 
Statutes 361 €^>217.4 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
36IVl(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction 
361 k217.4 k. Legislative History in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
Statutory ambiguities are resolved by looking to le-
gislative history and other policy considerations for 
guidance. 
[4| Statutes 361 €^>245 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 Vl(I3) Particular Classes of Statutes 
361k245 k. Revenue Laws. Most Cited 
Cases 
In the context of a taxation statute, Supreme Court's 
evaluation of ambiguous language requires it to 
construe language liberally in favor of the taxpayer, 
leaving it to the legislature to clarify an intent to be 
more restrictive if such intent exists. 
|5] Mines and Minerals 260 €^>87 
260 Mines and Minerals 
260III Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells 
260111(A) Statutory and Official Regulations 
260k87 k. Licenses; Severance and Pro-
duction Taxes. Most Cited Cases 
Application of "prospective effect doctrine" was 
appropriate with respect to Supreme Court's man-
date requiring calculation of state severance taxes 
on oil and gas interests to be based on value of oil 
and gas at immediate vicinity of point at which oil 
or gas was physically removed from earth, as retro-
active application could have resulted in large re-
funds of taxes already collected and spent by gov-
ernmental entities. U.CA.1953. 59-5-101, 59-5-103. 
© 2009 Tliomson Reuters/West. 
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*707 David J. Crapo, Salt Lake City, for petitioner. 
Mark L. Shurtlcff, Att'y Gen., Clark L. Snelson, 
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
Mark K. Buchi, Steven P. Young, Salt Lake City, 
for amici ConocoPhillips Company, Chevron-
Texaco Exploration and Production Company. 
Thomas W. Ciawson, Salt Lake City, for amicus 
Union Oil Company of California. 
Philip C. Pugslcy, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for amici Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund, Navajo 
Revitalization Fund. 
Steven F. Alder, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for amicus Utah Division of Oil, Gas, & Mining. 
Bill Thomas Peters, David W. Scoiield, Salt Lake 
City, for amicus Utah Association of Counties. 
WILKINS, Justice: 
K 1 ExxonMobil Corporation ("ExxonMobil") filed 
a petition for review of a Utah State Tax Commis-
sion ("Tax Commission") decision upholding the 
denial of ExxonMobil's request for a refund of al-
legedly miscalculated severance taxes on certain oil 
and gas interests. We reverse. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
U 2 The essential facts of this case are not in dis-
pute. ExxonMobil requested a refund of severance 
taxes it believes it overpaid from January 1, 1993 
through December 31, 1998. During that period, 
ExxonMobil operated numerous oil and gas wells 
in southeastern Utah that were subject to the sever-
ance tax imposed by Utah Code Ann. section* 
59-5-101 through-119 (2000). 
H 3 ExxonMobil's operation of the wells involves 
removing the oil and gas from the earth at the 
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mouth of the well. At that point, the oil and gas is 
in an emulsion form, mixed with impurities such as 
water and sand. The impurities in the emulsion are 
commonly known as basic sediment and water ("BS 
& W"). At the point of removal *708 from the 
earth, the entire emulsion is often referred to as 
total production and is conveyed from the mouth of 
the well, through a valve structure, and usually into 
a separator tank or through pipelines for additional 
refining. The emulsion "is almost never sold dir-
ectly from the [valve structure]." Selling oil and gas 
from the valve structure could be done, however, if 
some sort of portable testing device were brought to 
the site to measure volumes. Separator tanks are 
generally located in the immediate vicinity of the 
mouth of the well and allow the components of the 
emulsion to separate so that much of the BS & W is 
removed from the oil and gas. It appears from the 
record that any gas is generally separated from the 
rest of the emulsion at this point, while the oil and 
the remainder of the emulsion are transported to-
gether. Sometimes oil and gas are sold at this point, 
having been separated to some degree from the BS 
& W and readied for transport to other facilities. 
U 4 When the oil is not sold from a separator tank, 
the remaining emulsion is transported to a satellite 
facility that further treats the emulsion for sale. 
Much like at a separator tank, sales also occur at 
this point, but operators often elect instead to trans-
fer the oil to a tank battery facility where it is fur-
ther treated and then metered at a Lease Automatic 
Custody Transfer ("LACT") meter and loaded onto 
trucks or into pipelines. Though other entities do 
so, during the time period in question ExxonMobil 
rarely sold its oil directly from separator tanks in 
the immediate vicinity of the well, instead trans-
porting most of the oil to other facilities. When pur-
chases were made in the well's vicinity, the pur-
chase price was adjusted downward to account for 
the remaining impurities and transportation costs, 
among other things. In one transaction, the price 
paid by the purchaser was reduced from a posted 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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price of $12.79 per barrel to $9.29 per barrel. 
H 5 The Tax Commission's general practice in cal-
culating the severance tax due on oil has apparently 
been to base the tax on the price of the oil at the ac-
tual point of sale. Thus, oil sold from the separator 
tank, with its price adjusted downward, would be 
taxed at a percentage of that lower price, whereas 
oil sold from the battery facility would be taxed at 
the same rate, but on a higher purchase price. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
If 6 The Auditing Division of the Tax Commission 
("Auditing Division") denied ExxonMobil's request 
for a refund of severance taxes ExxonMobil be-
lieved it had overpaid. ExxonMobil appealed that 
decision to the Tax Commission, which bifurcated 
the factual issues of what amount of tax was due 
and paid from the legal issue of the appropriate 
point for calculating the tax. The Tax Commission 
held a formal hearing on the second issue. 
1| 7 ExxonMobil argued that the statutory provisions 
regarding the severance tax required the Auditing 
Division to value the oil at the well site, which is 
the point of removal from the earth. The Auditing 
Division argued that valuation should occur at the 
point of actual sale. The relevant statutory provi-
sions require that the tax be computed based on 
"the value, at the well, of the oil or gas," which is 
defined as "the value of oil or gas at the point pro-
duction is completed." Utah Code Ann. §§ 
59-5-102(l)(a), -101(19) (2000). The Tax Commis-
sion's decision was split with two of four commis-
sioners agreeing with the Auditing Division that 
valuation should occur at the point of sale, which it 
equated with completed production. One commis-
sioner agreed with ExxonMobil that valuation 
should occur at the point of removal but gave that 
interpretation prospective application only. The 
fourth commissioner also agreed that ExxonMobil's 
interpretation was correct, without the prospective 
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application limitation. Thus, the Tax Commission 
denied ExxonMobil's request for a refund. Exxon-
Mobil requested reconsideration of the decision, 
which was granted. 
lj 8 Upon reconsideration by the Tax Commission, 
two commissioners remained convinced of the cor-
rectness of the Auditing Division's position, while 
the other two commissioners remained convinced 
of the correctness of ExxonMobil's position. As to 
the prospective application of the rule, two com-
missioners now agreed that ExxonMobil should be 
entitled to relief. The Tax Commission*709 held, 
based on the tie vote between the four commission-
ers, that the Auditing Division prevailed and value 
would be measured at the point of sale for puiposes 
of determining whether ExxonMobil was entitled to 
the requested refund. Because ExxonMobil's refund 
request depended upon valuation at the point of re-
moval, summary judgment was entered against Ex-
xonMobil. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 
78-2-2 (2002), ExxonMobil petitioned this court for 
review of the Tax Commission's decision. 
11 9 On appeal, ExxonMobil argues that the Tax 
Commission erred by concluding that ExxonMobil 
was not the prevailing party. ExxonMobil contends 
that allowing the use of the Auditing Division's in-
terpretation of the method for calculating the sever-
ance tax allows the Commission to impose a tax 
despite the statutory mandate that the Tax Commis-
sion act only with a quorum of three agreeing. Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-1-205 (2000). Further, ExxonMobil 
argues that the Commission erred by declaring the 
Auditing Division the prevailing party despite the 
tie vote because there is a statutory presumption 
against taxation that cannot be overcome without a 
majority vote. Lastly, ExxonMobil argues that the 
Tax Commission's interpretation of the statutory 
language in question was in error. Because we re-
solve this matter by statutory interpretation, we 
need not consider ExxonMobil's arguments regard-
ing the failure of three members of the Tax Com-
mission to agree on an interpretation. 
© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest. 
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ANALYSIS 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] U 10 As questions of law, we review the Tax 
Commission's interpretations of the various stat-
utory provisions implicated in this matter for cor-
rectness, according the Tax Commission's interpret-
ations no deference. Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah Slate 
Tax Comm'n, 2002 UT 112. If 14. 61 P.3d 1053. 
II. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY PROVI-
SIONS 
H 11 Two particular statutes require our review. 
Both address valuation, providing: 
Each person owning an interest ... in oil or gas pro-
duced from a well in the state, or in the proceeds 
of the production, shall pay to the state a sever-
ance tax equal to 4% of the value, at the well, of 
the oil or gas produced, saved, and sold or trans-
ported from the field where the substance was 
produced. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(1 )(a) (2000). " 'Value 
at the well' means the value of oil or gas at the 
point production is completed." A/.§ 59-5-101(19). 
These two provisions form the crux of the dispute 
now before us. 
K 12 ExxonMobil contends that the severance tax is 
to be calculated based on the value of the oil or gas 
at the point at which it is removed from the earth. It 
argues that although the value of its interest at the 
well is further defined as the point of completed 
production, the terms "production" and "extraction" 
are used synonymously and render extraction as the 
appropriate measure. Id.§ 59-5-101(20). Read in 
light of section 59-5-103, which establishes meth-
ods of valuation, including the net-back method in 
which the costs of post-extraction transportation 
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and processing are deducted from the ultimate pur-
chase price, id.§ 59-5-101(7), ExxonMobil argues 
that its interpretation is compelled by the severance 
tax statutes. 
K 13 The Tax Commission counters that the stat-
utory requirement that production be completed pri-
or to valuation of the oil or gas necessarily implies 
some post-extraction alteration. Also citing the 
valuation section, 59-5-103, the Tax Commission 
argues that the clear statutory preference for valu-
ation by reference to an arm's-length contract sup-
ports its view that measuring the value of the oil 
and gas at the point at which it is removed from the 
earth is inappropriate given the dearth of sales that 
occur at the immediate point of removal. Rather, 
the Tax Commission suggests that, in the simplest 
of situations, sales occur after at least some of the 
BS & W is removed from the emulsion by storage 
in the separator tank. Thus, the argument goes, the 
clear preference for valuing the oil or gas by utiliz-
ing an arm's-length contract price would be ill-
served by a statutory scheme set up to determine 
value at a *710 point where such arm's-length sales 
rarely occur. 
[2][3"][4] K 14 When we interpret a statute, we look 
first to the plain language. In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 
853. 866 (Utah 1996). In doing so, we give all stat-
utory provisions relevance and meaning independ-
ent of other provisions. Id. If we find ambiguity in 
the statute's language, we look to legislative history 
and other policy considerations for guidance. Id. In 
the context of a taxation statute, our evaluation of 
ambiguous language also requires us to " 'construe 
taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer, 
leaving it to the legislature to clarify an intent to be 
more restrictive if such intent exists.' " County Bd. 
of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 944 P.2d 370, 373-74 (Utah 1997) 
(quoting Salt Lake County v. State Tax Comm'n, 
779 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989)). The statutory 
language in question in this case is not plain and we 
must resort to policy considerations and our man-
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date that taxing statutes be construed in favor of the 
taxpayer.fM Id. 
FNL We are not aware of, and the parties 
have not cited, any relevant legislative his-
tory that would inform our interpretation 
of the statutory provisions in question. 
K 15 Although both ExxonMobil and the Tax Com-
mission make reasonable arguments supporting 
their respective interpretations of the point of valu-
ation of oil and gas for severance tax purposes, 
neither party's position completely reconciles with 
the valuation provisions of the severance tax stat-
utes. Section 59-5-103 establishes the methods for 
computing the value of oil or gas for severance tax 
purposes. It provides that the value is to be 
"established under an arm's-length contract for the 
purchase of production at the well." Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-5-103(1) (2000). In the absence of an 
arm's-length contract, section 59-5-103 provides 
that other methods may be employed in descending 
order to determine value. First, value may be ascer-
tained by reference to a non-arm's-length contract if 
it "is equivalent to the value received under com-
parable arm's-length contracts for purchases or 
sales of like-quality oil or gas in the same field." Id. 
§ 59-5-103(l)(a). The next method of valuation al-
lowable under section 59-5-103 allows one to de-
termine value "by consideration of information rel-
evant in valuing like-quality oil or gas at the well in 
the same field or nearby fields or areas such as: 
posted prices, prices received in arm's-length spot 
sales, or other reliable public sources of price or 
market information." Id. § 59-5-103(l)(b). The fi-
nal method, allowed if no other method is applic-
able, is the net-back method, which allows a produ-
cer to determine the value of the oil or gas by de-
ducting costs of transporting and processing from 
the eventual sales or market price, up to 50% of the 
value of the oil or gas. Id. §§ 59-5-103(l)(c), -
101(7). The legislature's preferences for valuing oil 
and gas are clear from this statute. Our interpreta-
tion of the statutory language in sections 59-5-101 
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and -102 must give meaning and relevance to each 
of the valuation methods. In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 
at 866. 
K 16 The Tax Commission reasonably concludes 
that "production" supposes an alteration of the oil 
or gas from its natural state. However, were we to 
accept the Tax Commission's position, the net-back 
valuation method would have no relevance-a result 
we do not favor. Id. The Tax Commission's position 
could never result in utilization of the net-back 
method because any sale would necessarily be at 
the point of completed production, where the Tax 
Commission argues that valuation must occur. 
Thus, the transportation and refinement costs de-
ducted under the net-back method would never be 
deductible from a sale price, but would merely rep-
resent added value taxed as part of the increased 
purchase price. Additionally, the statutory defini-
tion of "well" notes that a well is an "extractive 
means." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(20) (2000). 
This seems to indicate physical extraction from the 
earth, not the extraction of oil or gas from other im-
purities further down the line as the Tax Commis-
sion suggests. 
K 17 ExxonMobil's interpretation would require us 
to slight the statute, albeit to a lesser degree. Its po-
sition is roughly that oil or gas should be valued at 
the point of removal from the earth. This argument 
ignores the clear legislative preference for 
valuation*711 by reference to actual contracts for 
sale, id.§ 59-5-103(1), because, according to the 
Tax Commission's unchallenged factual findings, 
sales rarely occur without at least some separation 
in a separator tank or some further refinement. 
U 18 Both parties support their interpretations by 
offering various definitions of "production" from 
different dictionaries, cases from other courts, and 
unrelated statutes. Neither the Tax Commission's 
position nor ExxonMobil's position is compelled by 
the language of the statute. Likewise, there is no in-
dication that the legislature intended its use of the 
word "production" in section 59-5-101(19) to be 
given any of the definitions suggested by the parties. 
T[ 19 Given the ambiguity in the statute, we are 
compelled to consider the general principle that we 
"construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of the 
taxpayer, leaving it to the legislature to clarify an 
intent to be more restrictive if such intent exists." 
County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County, 944 
P.2d at 373-74 (internal quotations omitted). Ap-
plying this standard, we hold that valuation does 
not necessarily occur at the point of sale, wherever 
that may be, but rather m the immediate vicinity of 
the point at which the oil or gas is physically re-
moved from the earth. However, to qualify as the 
point at which production is complete, that point 
must be one at which sales of the oil and gas may 
actually occur. 
T| 20 "At the well," where "production is complete," 
read in light of the language favoring valuation by 
reference to an arm's-length contract price but al-
lowing other methods, including the net-back meth-
od, contemplates valuation in the immediate vicin-
ity of the point of removal from the earth. The Tax 
Commission's position regarding the statutory 
meaning is incorrect because it relies heavily on 
one interpretation of the phrase "production is com-
pleted" instead of harmonizing the various defini-
tions at play in the severance tax statute. Accepting 
the Tax Commission's position would lead to a 
widely disparate tax, based not on the value of oil 
or gas actually removed from the ground and thus 
taken from the state's pool of natural resources, but 
based on the sales and marketing strategies of the 
various interest holders. A producer with testing fa-
cilities on site could sell directly from the well's 
valve structure and pay a much smaller tax than one 
who removes impurities or otherwise refines the oil 
to sell at the battery facility. The language of the 
statute contemplates calculation within the immedi-
ate vicinity of the point of removal from the earth, 
but it also compels calculation at some point where 
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sales are not a distinct rarity. 
T| 21 The nature of the industry is such that sales 
rarely, if ever, occur directly from the valve struc-
ture, which appears to be the point of valuation ad-
vocated by ExxonMobil. The statute, however, as-
sumes a market for oil and gas at the point of valu-
ation. Thus, although we hold that valuation is to 
occur in the immediate vicinity of the point of re-
moval, it need not necessarily occur at the point of 
physical removal from the earth. There appears to 
be a market for oil and gas taken from the separator 
tanks near the well head. The Tax Commission so 
found, although it apparently believed the failure of 
ExxonMobil to sell much of its oil and gas at that 
point was fatal to its claim for valuation there. This 
was error. Valuation of the oil and gas at the separ-
ator tank allows valuation to occur while the oil and 
gas are in a relatively raw state, at the earliest pos-
sible, yet practicable, point of sale. Where no separ-
ator tank is used, valuation may still occur by refer-
ence to the value of similar oil at separator tanks in 
the same field. This valuation system allows the use 
of the preferences outlined in section 59-5-103, un-
like the methods proposed by either of the parties. 
% 22 The Tax Commission and amici believe an in-
terpretation other than that adopted by the Tax 
Commission would drain state revenues at a time 
when revenue is relatively scarce. We are not blind 
to the impact of our holding on the amount of taxes 
collected and distributed to various governmental 
entities, but any concerns we have with the reduc-
tion of revenue are not properly assuaged by an 
ends-based statutory interpretation. If the legis-
lature established the severance tax scheme to real-
ize a specific revenue target and our interpretation 
of its statutory language does not provide that 
level*712 of revenue, the legislature may amend 
the relevant statutes to provide for a different calcu-
lation of the tax that will achieve the desired reven-
ue. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
III. APPLICATION OF OUR DECISION 
[5] H 23 The revenue concerns cited by the Tax 
Commission and amici convince us that application 
of our prospective effect doctrine is appropriate in 
this case. When invalidating the actions of a taxing 
authority, we have long recognized that our de-
cisions may be given prospective effect to protect 
the solvency of governmental entities and to avoid 
administrative and financial hardship caused by ret-
roactive application of rules contrary to those relied 
on by the taxing authorities. See, e.g., Rio Algom 
Corp v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184. 196 (Utah 
1984). We recognize, however, that preventing the 
retroactive application of the rule to ExxonMobil, 
which has expended considerable time and re-
sources to attack the actions of the Tax Commis-
sion, would both deprive ExxonMobil of the fruits 
of victory and "potentially] ... discourag[e] other 
litigants from challenging [actions] of questionable 
validity." V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
942 P.2d 906, 914 (Utah 1996) (citing Rio Algom, 
681 P.2d at \96),vacated on other grounds,942 
P.2d 915 (Utah 1997). We give our holding this se-
lectively prospective application because we are 
convinced that retroactive application could result 
in large refunds of taxes already collected and spent 
by governmental entities. Although the full breadth 
and depth of the impact is not immediately apparent 
from the record before us, no doubt it would be 
substantial and involve funds already budgeted, col-
lected, and spent. Large refunds of money already 
collected and spent would pose a great burden on 
the amici revitalization funds and other relatively 
small governmental entities operating on corres-
pondingly small budgets. Thus, whether in refund 
requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all but Ex-
xonMobil the rule announced today is to have pro-
spective application only. 
CONCLUSION 
1) 24 We reverse the Tax Commission's determina-
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tion that severance taxes should be based on the 
value of oil and gas at the point of eventual sale. 
Valuation must occur in the immediate vicinity of 
the well, with the oil and gas remaining in a relat-
ively natural state. Although ExxonMobil is entitled 
to further adjudication of its claim for a refund, as 
to other parties who may have refund requests, defi-
ciency proceedings, or similar matters pending be-
fore the Tax Commission, our holding is to apply 
prospectively only. Reversed. 
H 25 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief 
Justice DURRANI", Justice PARRJSH, and Justice 
NEHRING concur in Justice WILKINS' opinion. 
Utah,2003. 
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